'What must be done?' according to a 

'Philosophy of the Future' of and for Today


Martin Heidegger's essay 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' and Michel Foucault's closing of Les mots et les choses share a number of similarities. Both texts speak of the end of a mode of thinking and being, respectively, while mentioning the birth of a new stage. Both authors allude to the 'philosophy of the future', to use Friedrich Nietzsche's banner. In so doing, both philosophers re-enact the ultimate questions as formulated by Max Weber in the wake of Leo Tolstoi's insights that the nascent 'modes of thinking and being' alike are to address: 'what shall we do and how shall we live?', queries which Immanuel Kant rather formulates as : 'What can be known [...], what must be done, and what may be hoped?'

I propose to tentatively answer these queries with a remit: transposing ecocidal technoscientific practices as well as philosophical and religious worldviews that exalt White Man at the expense of other sacred forms. 


TRANSPOSING WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

INTO A POST-ECOCIDAL PRACTICE...

entails, inter alia, relinquishing the static 'concept' instituted by Plato and Aristotle and embracing  relentless activity   


Critique of Western Metaphysics 

from the Transpositional Perspective 


No Being, No Thinking but Trans-Positions and Engaging-Constraining Immanence

Western metaphysics is defined as the attempt to either identify or align thought and being. 'What obsolete terms 'thinking' and 'being'!' claims the cultures of transpositions. 

The transposition qua simultaneous correlation demonstrates that cognition or high-culture can only meet cognition or high-culture; it can't meet being because there is no such thing: there are only trans-positions to some degree. These in turn are endowed with cognition or high-culture, relations and politics or middle-culture, and an embodied dimension or low-culture. 

Trans-positions receive (or assault) other trans-positions orderly: the high-culture of, say, a human, meets the high-culture of, say, a stone. If the human transposes the stone to a high degree to the extent that it accepts and respects its high-culture, namely, the decision of the latter to have a given colour, texture and size. The human transposes the stone to a low degree namely, it poses it— to the extent that it fails to acknowledge the latter's high-culture or decision to have a given colour, texture and size.

The transposition qua regimes of engaging-constraining immanence, for their part, show that there is no such thing as thinking but indeed engaging or constraining immanence. Namely, there is only the meeting of another's (in the non-anthropocentric sense) high-culture either by way of loci standi or instrumenta movendi , or by a mixture of both.    


The Obvious Complicity between Onto-logy and Logo-centrism

Assuming the existence of 'being' entails logocentrism in Jacques Derrida's sense or restricted economy in George Bataille's. Namely, it entails the self-presentation of meaning and full knowability, respectively. That is, the ability to fully trace the attributes of being is assumed. It follows that ontology and logocentrism go hand-in-hand.  

Instead of intending to outline the attributes of being, the cultures of transpositions seek a much more modest and conjunctural task. Namely, they aim to spot the trans-positional abilities that each situation endow manufacturers of culture and fossilizations alike with.   


 Activity Dethrones the Active/Passive Divide and the Thing-in-Itslef 

There is no active-passive relationship among transpositions. All transpositions are active even if some operate as positions to a large extent and thus cut the transitivities off other transpositions they pose them. Unless we learn to acknowledge the 'activity' of all transpositions, philosophy remains a detached metaphysics that conceals the politics reigning in the religantes —'kosmos', 'world'. What's more, in such case philosophy naturalizes inequity as it is unable to detect it, let alone redress it .

Everything is inexorably transposed to some extent into the religantes by conterminous trans-positions. This means that everything —all trans-positions— never ceases to be activity. Everything is inalienably enmeshed in politics. It follows that the religantes is engaging-constraining by default. Actually, the 'world' is indeed but a religantes (a pool of 'bindings' in accordance with the etymological root of the latter) in so far as it is made up of inescapable trans-positions to some degree. 

This shows again that the so-called real, the thing-in-itself is an illusion. Everything comes into the world as a trans-position to some degree, which in turn trans-poses to some extent contiguous trans-positions it facilitates or obstructs their transposing. There are no static, everlasting things but ever-changing, fluctuating trans-positions due to the relentless activity of surrounding trans-positions and their own. In short, there are no things-in-themselves but 'among ourselves'     


The Construction of Objects Downgrades the Trans-Positions 

Western metaphysics builds upon a number of binary pairs. A pivotal one is the subject/object

 divide. The trans-positional perspective reveals that such chasm is extremely ecocidal and thus ecocidal Let's explain why at some length. 

The religantes is ineluctably made up of trans-positions that enjoy high- middle- and low-cultural dimensions. Downgrading them to mere (inert) objects as a result of exalting a bogus subject is a token of a superlative lack of respect for the wholeness and thus holiness intrinsic to the transposition. (Let us indeed recall that 'whole' and 'holy' are imbricated etymologically section below 'The Role of Cognition in the Post-Ecocidal Cultures of Transpositions.)   


  

Perspectivism qua Embodiment as 

Post-Ontology and Post-Epistemology 

Nietzsche denies the existence of a univocal truth as well as the attendant thing-in-itself (or 'fact-in-itself'). This denial affects the construction of both 'reality' and 'meaning'. Nietzsche's is a critique of truth in the Platonic-Kantian tradition. Instead, the German philosopher claims, utterances of truth irremediably emanate out of a given perspective. Perspectivism that is, situates us beyond classical ontological and epistemological ground.   


Embodiment

Nietzsche distinguishes three basic types of perspective, each constraining the construction of 'reality' and 'meaning'. These three types may go under the headings 'physiological', 'instinctual' and 'socio-historical'. By emphasizing the physiological dimension we must state that Nietzsche pioneers work in the direction of embodiment scholarship. In Daybreak in a paragraph entitled 'In Prison' we read the following: 

Our ears enclose us within a [...] circle. and so does our sense of touch. Now, it is by these horizons, within which each of us encloses his senses as if behind prison walls, that we measure the world, we say that this is near and that far, this is big and that small, this is hard and that soft.    

The instinctual perspectives are closely related to the socio-historical ones, for the former are just the sedimentation of the latter incorporated into the human being as part of their 'essence'. 

At any rate, we may tentatively profess that embodiment stands at the other side of ontology and epistemology. 


The Role of Cognition 

in the Post-Ecocidal Cultures of Transpositions

Logocentrism states that logos (the Greek term for 'speech', 'thought', 'law' or 'reason') is the central principle of philosophy and language. In sharp contrast, the cultures of transpositions profess that there are no principles in philosophy. Rather, these cultures prompt us to go from transposition to transposition, the role of cognition being the following. 

Philosophically (or high-culturally) we ought to construe a relation of views stemming from, informed by, the extant panorama. We ought to come up with categories of knowledge apt to address the contemporaneous conjuncture. This should allow us to conduct a scientific (or middle-cultural) analysis geared at the assessing of the regimes of engaging-constraining immanence that form themselves in the encounters among manufacturers of culture and extant fossilizations. The aim of the exploration of the emerging regimes of engaging-constraining immanence is the consideration of undertaking transpositions that lead to higher degrees of engaging immanence so that whole culture may be experienced.  

It should be noted that etymologically the words 'whole', 'holy' and 'healthy' are germane. They come from the Proto-Germanic root haila- 'undamaged'. This means that when manufacturers of culture experience the whole of culture in the regimes of engaging immanence, they undergo a holy, sacred experience. 

In short, the role of cognition in the post-ecocidal cultures of transpositions is that of assessing the extent to which manufactures of culture may enjoy a wholly and, for that matter, holy, undamaged, complete experience. An experience, that is, which is both fulfilling and free of practices that degrade loci standi.